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Crunch Time for Water Quality Trading
Dennis M. King
Economists have been promoting water quality (WQ)
trading for decades. Over the past few years, many politi-
cal leaders and upper-level government officials have been
joining them. Money has even started to flow from Wash-
ington to local trading organizations to help make WQ
trading work. However, enthusiasm about WQ trading is
based mostly on conceptual arguments about its potential
to generate cost savings and ideological arguments about
the superiority of market-based solutions over conven-
tional regulatory programs. Experiences with actual WQ
trading programs have been discouraging. Under current
regulatory conditions, there is simply not enough supply
or demand to support WQ trading. The critical question
now is whether the regulatory conditions that are inhibit-
ing trading will change any time soon.
According to a recent EPA-funded review, the number
of WQ trading initiatives in the United States during
2004 was more than 70 (Breetz et al., 2004), which is up
from around 25 just a few years earlier (Environomics,
1999; King & Kuch, 2003) However, this recent review,
like previous ones, showed that WQ trading programs are
frozen at an awkward pretrading stage of development—
plenty of new guidelines, regional trading institutions, and
computer simulations of trading, and even some well-
developed WQ trading software and websites, but very lit-
tle actual trading taking place. Most importantly, point/
nonpoint1 trading involving agriculture—the type that
will be needed for WQ trading to have a significant impact
in many watersheds and the type of trading that will be
addressed in this article—has not materialized at all.
Advocates of WQ trading are putting their hopes on
the anticipated establishment over the next few years of
Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) for individual
water bodies. These are a kind of total pollution budget
that could be divided among pollution dischargers as indi-
vidual discharge allowances that could be made tradable.
The Clean Water Act of 1972 required each state to
develop and implement TMDLs by 1979, but they are
only now being developed in most parts of the country.
Eventually, TMDLs may provide the market driver that is
needed to make WQ trading work. (See Boyd, 2000.)
However, establishing TMDLs will merely be the first of
many steps that will all need to be taken quickly if WQ
trading is to be given a fair chance to succeed. State and
local WQ regulators, under increasing pressure to do
something soon about growing WQ problems, are begin-
ning to turn to familiar command-and-control methods
and subsidy programs that often preclude the possibility of
ever having meaningful WQ trading.
The three questions that even diehard trading advo-
cates are beginning to ask are: Why are there so few WQ
trading success stories? Why aren’t the point and nonpoint
sources who are supposed to benefit from WQ trading
more supportive? What can be done to improve the situa-
tion?
Reviews of regional WQ trading programs reveal the
most often cited problems inhibiting regional WQ trad-
ing, such as inadequate trading institutions, unclear scor-
ing criteria, and high transactions costs of performing
trades, are being overcome in most places (King & Kuch,
2003).  What is preventing WQ trading is a simple
absence of willing buyers and sellers. Under existing regu-
latory conditions, the supply and demand curves in fledg-
ling WQ markets barely exist and certainly don’t cross at
any positive price. Moreover, those attempting to make
regional WQ work are usually not in positions to change
the situation. Tighter federal and/or state limits on indi-
vidual dischargers will be required before there will be any
commodities (rights) to trade in WQ markets; aggressive
enforcement of those limits will then be needed to bolster
supply and demand.
1. Point sources discharge pollution from a single place, 
such as a pipeline outflow. Nonpoint sources discharge 
pollution from many places, such as along the edge of 
a farm or housing development.72 CHOICES 1st Quarter 2005 • 20(1)
New Water Quality Trading 
Guidance
In November 2004, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA)
published a Water Quality Trading
Assessment Handbook (EPA, 2004) to
help regional organizations establish
“the necessary conditions for success-
ful WQ trading.” This national guid-
ance is very general and focuses on
tasks such as developing trading insti-
tutions, measuring the equivalency of
pollution discharges, establishing
rules of exchange, setting baselines,
assigning liability, and so on. Most of
these tasks may be necessary for suc-
cessful WQ trading. However , none
of them will provide the buyers and
sellers that are really needed for WQ
trading programs to succeed. In fact,
managers of the existing regional
WQ trading programs that have been
failing to produce trades have already
completed most of the tasks recom-
mended in these new EPA guidelines.
What are needed beyond what is out-
lined in the EPA guidance are steps
that will change the incentives and
disincentives facing prospective buy-
ers and sellers in ways that will make
them want to trade.
Time Pressure
Developments in the Chesapeake
Bay region, especially in the State of
Maryland, illustrate why these steps
need to take place soon, before WQ
trading becomes impossible. More
than three years of work by a partner-
ship of state/federal resource agencies
and stakeholders culminated in 2003
with a set of guidelines to support
watershed-based WQ trading. At
that time, it was generally assumed
that TMDLs were just around the
corner and that once trading guide-
lines were adopted, trading would
take place with wastewater treatment
facilities (point sources) that have rel-
atively high discharge treatment costs
purchasing WQ “allowances” from
agricultural interests (nonpoint
sources) with relatively low discharge
reduction costs.
In early 2004, however, Mary-
land’s governor and state legislature
responded to public pressure to do
something about WQ by establishing
an innovative $2.50 per month “flush
tax” on water and sewer users (mostly
urban dwellers) to create a fund to
subsidize the installation of state-of-
the-art discharge treatment technolo-
gies at the state’s wastewater facilities.
A similar tax was levied on house-
holds on wells and septic systems
(mostly rural dwellers) to subsidize
the planting of agricultural cover
crops and other agricultural “best
management practices.” Of course,
the flush tax all but eliminated the
expected demand for WQ credits by
wastewater facilities; and the subsidi-
zation of agricultural practices all but
eliminated the expected supply of
low-cost agricultural WQ credits.
With the stroke of the governor’s
pen, prospects for WQ trading any
time soon in Maryland evaporated.
Beyond the ABCs of WQ Trading
In principle, establishing an emission
trading program is a simple three-
step process involving: (a) establish-
ing an overall cap on pollution dis-
charges, (b) allocating portions of the
cap as allowances to individual dis-
charge sources, and (c) allowing each
source to meet its allowance by
reducing its discharge or by purchas-
ing credits from other sources that
reduce their discharges below their
allowances. As long as there are dif-
ferences in discharge reduction costs,
sources with high costs of meeting
their allowances will purchase credits
from sources with low costs, and a
market will be born. This is the pro-
cess that established the highly
acclaimed and apparently successful
air emission trading programs that
helped reduce SO2 emission (acid
rain) problems (see Stavins, this
issue).
However, the land and water use
decisions by nonpoint sources that
cause local water quality problems are
very different than the point source
smokestacks that cause regional air
pollution problems. Most water
emissions are difficult to measure,
change with the weather, have differ-
ent impacts depending on where they
occur, and are the results of ever-
changing locally made and locally
regulated decisions. This is a compli-
cated problem to attempt to address
with trading. In fact, two areas of
recent economic research suggest that
in this type of situation a great deal of
political and regulatory reform may
b e  n e c e s s a r y  t o  i n t e r e s t  a n y o n e  i n
trading.
The first area of economic
research won two economists—Finn
Kydland of Carnegie Mellon Univer-
sity and Edward Prescott of Arizona
State University—the 2004 Nobel
Prize in economics. Kydland and
Prescott (1977) explained why and
how people “game” regulatory pro-
grams; that is, why and how they
strategize to evade regulations and
employ legal and political maneuver-
ing to avoid, delay, and reduce penal-
ties for violating regulations they
cannot avoid. The second involves
work in what might be called “envi-
ronmental enforcement economics.”
This area of research also addresses
how people “game” regulatory pro-
grams, but focuses specifically on
that little benefit/cost calculation
that each regulated entity performs to
determine whether or not to comply
with a regulation.
Market-based solutions to WQ
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ric to the contrary, are not substitutes
for regulatory solutions; they rely on
and complement regulations. It is
well known, for example, that the
acid rain trading program succeeded
because precise individual SO2 dis-
charge limits were established and
strictly enforced with 100% moni-
toring and severe financial penalties
for violators (see Stavins, this issue).
F o r  n o w ,  a t  l e a s t ,  m o s t  n o n p o i n t
water pollution dischargers are either
unregulated or do not expect that
violating regulations will be detected
or will be very costly. As a result, they
have little incentive to get involved in
allowance trading. Many of them are
also aware that accepting the notion
that tradable discharge allowances
(i.e., “pollution rights”) can be neatly
defined and assigned to individual
entities could undermine their long-
term political and legal strategies for
fending off regulations. Asserting
that they have a credible basis for
earning money by selling WQ credits
now, in other words, means that oth-
ers will have a credible basis for justi-
fying future restrictions on their
emissions that could result in signifi-
cant long-term costs later.
Based on the above-mentioned
economic research, what is being
observed in WQ trading programs,
in other words, is exactly what should
be expected. In the face of weak,
rarely enforced emission discharge
restrictions and penalties for non-
compliance that are small and easily
avoided, few dischargers are inter-
ested in buying WQ credits. Where
there is no demand for WQ credits,
there is no incentive for anyone to try
to supply credits. This is a fairly sim-
ple conclusion, but it implies that
strategies to improve point/nonpoint
WQ trading should focus on
demand-side and supply-side issues,
rather than the institutional and
technical issues that occupy the time
of most WQ trading experts.
Demand-Side Issues
To appreciate what needs to be done
to stimulate demand, it is useful to
abandon the standard economist’s
operating assumption that a potential
buyer’s willingness to pay for a WQ
credit is based on that entity’s mar-
ginal cost of complying with nutrient
discharge restrictions (e.g., dollars
per pound of nutrient discharge
reduction). Instead, assume that the
correct measure of an entity’s willing-
ness to pay for a credit is the expected
cost of not complying with a govern-
ment-imposed discharge restriction.
If the expected cost of not complying
is lower than the cost of complying
by purchasing credits, there is no eco-
nomic incentive to purchase credits.
Virtually everywhere that WQ
trading is being attempted, laws lim-
iting nutrient discharges (on non-
point sources at least) are weak, rarely
enforced, and involve such low pen-
alties that the expected cost of non-
compliance is near zero. The
corresponding willingness to pay for
nutrient discharge credits, therefore,
is also near zero. There is no “natu-
ral” demand in regulation-driven
markets; demand always depends on
what regulations are in place and how
they are enforced.
The two 2004 Nobel-winning
economists examined the deterrent
effects of regulations in considerable
detail and pointed out the impact of
what they labeled “time inconsistency
problems” with many regulatory pro-
grams. In case after case involving
financial and real estate markets,
flood insurance markets, and envi-
ronmental compliance, they showed
that people, acting alone and in
groups, significantly discounted the
expected cost (penalty) of not com-
plying with a regulation if they
believed that it would not be imple-
mented consistently over time and
could be influenced later. Kydland
and Prescott’s work demonstrated
that people tend to believe that if
government yields to one kind of
political pressure to pass laws restrict-
ing their polluting behavior now,
they can be expected to yield to other
political pressure later that will pre-
vent the enforcement of those laws or
the imposition of meaningful penal-
ties.
Their research showed that the
success or failure of regulatory sys-
tems (market based or otherwise)
depends overwhelmingly on bottom-
up microeconomic decisions regard-
ing opportunities to game those sys-
tems, and far less on macroeconomic
governmental decisions about how
those systems are supposed to work.
Based on this research, it seems
that bolstering the demand side of
WQ markets will require mustering
the political will to establish a credi-
ble system for enforcing individual
allowances, and imposing meaning-
ful penalties for exceeding them.
Supply-Side Issues
The gaming model (as opposed to
the marginal cost model) also
explains what is inhibiting the supply
side of regional WQ trading markets.
In watersheds where agricultural
sources are significant, it is usually
assumed that they will be the primary
suppliers of WQ credits. However,
the willingness of farmers to supply
WQ credits depends in critical ways
on how it might affect their ability to
continue receiving agricultural subsi-
dies and green payments and to fend
off future environmental regulations.
The main problems farmers face here
(although they do not refer to them
in these terms) are what in environ-
mental trading circles have become
known as baseline/additionality issues.74 CHOICES 1st Quarter 2005 • 20(1)
To protect the integrity of trading
programs, trading guidelines nearly
always prohibit farmers from selling
credits for undertaking land use/land
management changes that are legally
required (e.g., by state regulation) or
for which the farmer has already been
paid (e.g., green payments). Setting
the baseline for credits in this way
reduces the ability of farmers in most
watersheds to supply low-cost WQ
credits. However, it has other impacts
on farmers as well. It means produc-
ing WQ credits by implementing
management practices that go
beyond what they are already
required to do will require farmers to
somehow validate that these practices
do, in fact, reduce discharge levels.
The need to establish a baseline and
show additionality poses two prob-
lems for farmers who are considering
supplying WQ credits.
First, it requires that someone
examine and document what farm-
ers are already doing to meet their
legal requirements in order to estab-
lish the baseline for measuring mar-
ketable WQ credits. Most farmers,
for obvious reasons, are not inter-
ested in having government represen-
tatives or their agents examining,
thinking, and talking about the legal-
ity of their on-farm land use/land
management practices or their justifi-
cation for green payments.
Second, farmers know that their
discharges are not regulated as much
as discharges from most other sources
because, presumably, farm discharges
are too difficult to control or mea-
sure, too dependent on the weather,
too expensive for farmers to manage,
and so on. Selling credits requires
farmers to provide evidence to vali-
date that, in fact, they can reduce
their discharges and document the
results. Many analysts have addressed
validation requirements in terms of
their potential to increase transaction
costs associated with completing
market trades and the likelihood that
these higher costs could drive a
wedge between buyers and sellers.
However, a more important problem
may be that if farmers show that they
can validate the creditworthiness of
their on-farm activities, it is bound to
call into question whether they
should be regulated any differently
than other dischargers.
There are also other disincentives
facing farmers. The price farmers will
accept for WQ credits reveals their
discharge control costs and shows the
world that they are most certainly
lower than the discharge control costs
of those buying credits. This focuses
attention on what many already
believe are inequities in the way dis-
charges are regulated and, perhaps, in
the way allocations of discharge
allowances are made to farmers and
others. It also provides evidence that
a better long-term cost-saving strat-
egy for dealing with WQ problems
might be to tighten restrictions on
farmers with low treatment costs and
relax them on other dischargers who
have higher marginal treatment costs.
The sources of these disincentives
on the supply side of WQ trading are
similar to those on the demand side.
Weak, vague, and largely unenforced
discharge restrictions inhibit poten-
tial suppliers from engaging in trad-
ing, just as they inhibit potential
buyers. However, the strategies that
farmers can and will use to game
market-based environmental pro-
grams are intertwined with their
strategies for gaming other govern-
ment programs, so supply-side prob-
lems appear to be more complex.
The Immediate Challenge
Careful observers of emerging WQ
trading understand that this type of
market-based solution is not an alter-
native to WQ regulations. However,
this is still not fully understood by
many political leaders and agency
heads. One immediate challenge,
therefore, is to convince those who
are using the promise of market-
based environmental solutions as a
justification for relaxing regulations
that this strategy cannot succeed.
Another immediate challenge is to
convince those who are introducing
new WQ initiatives, such as manda-
tory engineering or discharge stan-
dards, that their decisions may make
it impossible to have WQ trading or
to realize potential cost savings from
W Q  t r a d i n g .  A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  i t
would be useful for those involved in
developing regional WQ trading to
perform what might be called a “WQ
enforcement audit” in their region to
determine how much political and
regulatory reform will be needed to
stimulate supply and demand and
make WQ trading work.
The fact remains, however, that
the regulatory context that provides
the incentives and disincentives for
buyers and sellers to participate in
regional WQ trading is usually not
within the control of the people who
are attempting to make regional WQ
trading work. One useful strategy,
therefore, is for those people (and all
the rest of us who want WQ trading
to have a chance to live up to its
potential) to work together to influ-
ence state and federal agencies and
elected officials who set the legal and
regulatory context for WQ trading.
Such an initiative could focus on the
following five tasks:
• Make sure the new EPA guidance
is followed when establishing a
WQ trading program;
• discourage command-and-con-
trol regulatory programs that
inhibit WQ trading;1st Quarter 2005 • 20(1) CHOICES 75
• encourage binding discharge
restrictions on point and non-
point sources;
• encourage meaningful monitor-
ing and enforcement of restric-
tions with stiff penalties; and
• determine gaming strategies that
point and nonpoint sources will
use to limit regulation and avoid
penalties and encourage counter-
vailing public policies.
If these tasks are undertaken
soon, the potential of WQ trading
might be realized. If not, WQ trad-
ing will probably wind up in the
overflowing dustbin of well-inten-
tioned economic policies that
attracted attention for a while but
never delivered.
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